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Slaughtered at the Altar of Free Trade: are WTO rules hindering the 
progression of animal welfare standards in agriculture? 
 
Victoria E. Hooton 
This article analyses the WTO legal framework to determine whether trade liberalisation, 
particularly through the definition of ‘like products’, and the exceptions to free trade rules found in 
GATT Article XX, are accommodating enough to permit advancements in animal welfare 
legislation. Sovereign legislatures have taken steps to promote higher standards for animal welfare 
within their territories. The European Union in particular is a frontrunner for promoting high animal 
welfare regulation, in order to provide safer products, greater human health and consumer-friendly 
regimes. The steps that have already been taken, domestically and in bilateral trade agreements, 
may be seen as a move towards an international recognition that animal welfare is an important 
factor in the production of food from agriculture. It is therefore important for WTO law to 
accommodate for the increasing concern around animal welfare. This article will argue that the 
current framework does not accommodate for these concerns, and may in fact prove to be a strong 
deterrent against import bans and other trade restrictions that would prevent low animal welfare 
goods being imported and marketed in territories with otherwise very strong animal welfare values.  
Introduction 
 
In light of the increasing focus on farming culture and practices, and their impact on the environment 
and animal welfare,1 this article will review the current World Trade Organisation (WTO) free trade 
framework and determine whether it could hinder progression towards better international standards in 
farming. Firstly, this article suggests that there is an increasing international recognition for the 
importance of animal welfare, which creates a fundamental issue for the WTO, if its rules do not allow 
for growth of legislation in this area. Secondly, an analysis of the problematic relationship between 
animal welfare and international trade laws is presented, which in turn assesses the effects of the 
relationship on future farm animal welfare progression.  
The scope of this article is confined to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-embedded 
provisions that affect animal welfare – Articles I, III and the permitted exceptions in Article XX; 
although it should be noted that other areas of WTO law may affect animal welfare measures, such as 
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, which are outside the scope of this article. As the European Union (EU) is a 
key player in the recognition and implementation of important animal welfare standards, this article 
will utilise the EU as an example of how domestic regulators can face difficulties regulating their farmed 
product markets within the WTO framework.  
Part 1: The International Movement Relating to Animal Welfare: 
 
The WTO should be aware and considerate of increasing animal welfare standards in the production 
and trade of farmed food products, due to the internationalisation of animal welfare as a concept. The 
WTO is a large international body comprised of 160 members, it is in the best interests of the WTO and 
the contracting parties that it keeps up to date with shifting perceptions regarding agricultural trade. 
There are a few indications that animal welfare is an emerging international concept, something which 
international trade lawyers have been debating for some years.2 On a plainly rhetorical basis, there is 
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the fact that advocates of animal welfare standards are apparently ‘international’. Sykes3 notes that the 
two main bodies campaigning against seal hunting in a WTO dispute against the EU were both 
international organisations: Humane Society International and the International Fund for Animal 
Welfare, both of which campaign on establishing shared global norms about the treatment of animals. 
There is also the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that provides guidelines for farm animal 
welfare. The OIE is concerned with informing practice, based on scientific evidence, on the slaughter 
of animals, animal transport and the keeping of livestock. While there is no international treaty 
concerning farmed animal welfare as of yet, there is the conservation treaty CITES,4 which places 
emphasis on the welfare of the individual species it covers. There is a European treaty on animal 
welfare, drafted by the council of Europe,5 which focuses on five basic guarantees for farmed animals 
that are identical to those of importance in the EU: freedom from discomfort, freedom from hunger and 
thirst, freedom from fear and distress, freedom from pain, injury and disease and freedom to express 
natural behaviour.6 These freedoms are formed on the basis that the States within the Council of Europe 
consider “that it is desirable to adopt common provisions for the protection of animals kept for farming 
purposes, particularly in modern intensive stock-farming systems.”7 
The main centre of animal welfare legislation is in the EU, which is heavily invested in the idea of 
increased animal welfare at the regional and international level, and was the subject of one of the very 
few animal welfare related WTO disputes to date.8 The EU legal framework is pioneering the debate 
around animal welfare and ethics, by recognising animals as sentient beings9 and developing welfare 
legislation10 with the potential to affect the production and transportation of animals and animal-related 
products throughout the world. The EU has created standards on battery cages for laying hens,11 
stunning standards for humane slaughter of animals,12 and has banned gestation crates for pregnant 
sows.13 Moreover, less relevant to farming and welfare, the EU has banned cosmetic testing on 
animals,14 increased standards of care for animals used in scientific testing15 and has increased standards 
for transported animals.16 The farming standards introduced at the EU level have been adopted in other 
jurisdictions; the poultry legislation particularly has been impactful: “The EU legislation, rather than 
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Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs, (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 
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5 European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes Strasbourg, 10.III.1976 
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7 European Convention for the Protection of Animals, at (n.5)  
8 DS401: European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 2014 
9 Article 13, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 47–390 
10 Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes 
OJ L 221 
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solely EU consumer attitudes, has been a major factor in this world-wide change, which is 
accelerating.”17  
The EU’s attention to animal welfare standards will continue to internationalise the issue, particularly 
through trade agreements with third parties. Article 89 of the EU-Chile trade agreement18 includes 
animal welfare provisions, and a commitment to develop standards in line with the OIE’s scientific 
guidance. The agreement’s reference to animal welfare revolved around stunning and slaughter of 
animals, and the creation of a Committee to develop other animal welfare standards that are of 
importance to the EU and Chile. The EU gives technical assistance and guidance on how to make the 
practice of slaughter more humane.19 The EU’s recently concluded trade deal with Japan also contains 
an animal welfare provision, in Article 18.17,20 which specifically requires ‘a focus on farmed animals’ 
and the ability to establish a working group on animal welfare for the purposes of information and 
expertise exchange.   
Animal welfare was also a moot point in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations between the EU and USA, before their breakdown. There is an undeniable dichotomy 
between the standards of livestock treatment in the US and the EU,21 the latter including in its textual 
proposal on regulatory cooperation a high level of protection for animal welfare as central to the 
negotiation.22 The European Free Trade Association’s (EFTA) agreement with the EU, the European 
Economic Agreement (EEA),  also concerns itself with animal welfare.23 It is clear that animal welfare 
will be an issue in all EU bilateral trade agreements, as noted by the EU Commission.24  If the provisions 
of regional trade agreements are ‘stepping stones’  for international trade norms, it would be wise for 
the WTO to recognise the emerging importance of animal welfare concerns and uphold that importance 
within the multilateral framework. 
The EU in 1999 drafted proposals for the WTO to consider addressing the issue of animal welfare.25 
Swinbank26 notes the unpopularity of the paper, especially amongst developing countries more 
concerned with decreasing poverty than the welfare aspects of their food.27 This article does not dispute 
that animal welfare standards will be highly divergent across the members of the WTO;  even the 
Member States of the EU appear to have differing views on the necessity of animal welfare standards 
imposed at the transnational level.28 However, support for animal welfare of some level, however 
divergent, has consistently grown since 1999 and developing countries have also concerned themselves 
                                                          
17 European Parliament, Study on Animal Welfare in the European Union, Directorate General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs PE 583.114, p31  
18 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, 2002 
19 European Commission, Slaughter and Stunning: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare/practice/slaughter_en> (accessed on 01.08.19) 
20 Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, 2019  
21 See <http://www.pig-world.co.uk/news/highlighting-the-differences-how-uk-welfare-standards-compare-
with-our-competitors.html> (accessed 01.08.19)  
22 Article X1, TTIP- EU proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf> (accessed 01.08.19) 
23 See Joint Declaration 29 on Animal Welfare, Agreement on the European Economic Area - Final Act - Joint 
Declarations - Declarations by the Governments of the Member States of the Community and the EFTA States, 
OJ L 1 
24 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: On the impact of animal welfare 
international activities on the competitiveness of European livestock producers in a globalized world 
COM(2018) 42 final 
25 Preparations for The 1999 Ministerial Conference, EC Approach on Agriculture, Communication from the 
European Communities WT/GC/W/273 
26 Alan Swinbank, 'Like Products, Animal Welfare and the World Trade Organization' (2006) 40 J WORLD 
TRADE 687 
27 Alan Swinbank, ibid, p690   
28 See Special Report No.31 2018: Animal welfare in the EU: closing the gap between ambitious goals and 
practical implementation, pp41-46 ; also Compassion in World Farming:   
<https://www.ciwf.org.uk/news/2014/06/greece-continues-to-flout-eu-law> (accessed 01.08.19)  
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with animal welfare. Countries such as Peru, Costa Rica, Thailand and the Philippines have 
implemented animal welfare legislation.29  Developing countries may also gain technical assistance 
from the OIE in relation to implementing the farm animal welfare standards.  
International principles are generally derived from domestic laws, taking into consideration that almost 
all the world’s domestic legal systems…include some kind of broad legal prohibition on unnecessary 
cruelty to animals  including some constitutions;  Sykes argues that it is wholly possible that an 
international principle of animal welfare is emerging.30  If such a principle is emerging, then as per the 
rules of the Vienna Convention, the WTO dispute organs will need to take it into consideration when 
considering trade disputes.31 This does not necessarily mean that the WTO dispute settlement bodies 
would need to give precedence to the concept of animal welfare, but it would not be wise for the WTO 
to ignore any internationally recognised principle for they reflect shared values, so accommodating 
them gives a legitimacy to dispute settlement and ignoring them may do the opposite and create an 
isolated regime that permits states to evade their international obligations and hinders increased animal 
welfare protection. 
Part 2: The relationship between animal welfare and international trade 
 
2.1 Why does increased farm animal welfare conflict with international trade? 
The fundamental reason that animal welfare concerns and conflicts with international trade law is the 
fact that animal welfare regulations will restrict trade, and the ultimate goal for international trade and 
the WTO is to liberalise free trade and reduce trade barriers globally.  Farmed animals are a huge 
commodity in the area of agriculture. Any policy or legislation intended to prevent any unnecessary 
suffering of animals used for food production, is likely to slow down the production process and reduce 
profits.32 Animals that are intended for food production are therefore likely to be exposed to harm, 
cruelty and suffering due to the perception that low animal welfare production methods are cheaper and 
therefore yield greater profits than a process geared to ensuring animals’ comfort and health. The EU 
parliamentary study notes that intensive farming can “lead to aberrant behaviour in laying hens such 
as feather pecking and cannibalism, aggression and tail biting in pigs and aggression in calves. To 
control this undesirable behaviour, it is common practice to perform painful physical alterations on 
animals, in particular beak trimming, tail docking, castration and teeth clipping.”33 EU law sets out 
measures to prohibit this treatment of animals, but in turn those measures reduce the intensity of farming 
and therefore its profitability. EU measures on humane slaughtering also may reduce the speed at which 
animals can be processed, which also reduces the economy of slaughter.34 
As a result of these processes affecting the economies of scale in food production there is a perception 
that high animal welfare standards, without the requirement of equal standards for imports and exports, 
carries the risk of reduction in competitiveness or even loss of businesses to countries where production 
is more profitable due to lower standards.35 Whether such business affects occur is uncertain,36 but in 
order to equalise the market for national or regional businesses adhering to higher animal welfare 
standards, animal welfare policies and guidelines should also be required for all imported products.  
A further reason for regional or national legislators requiring equal animal welfare standards for 
products that are imported, exported and national is that regional economies must respond to market 
demands for farmed products that accommodate for animal welfare concerns in their processing 
                                                          
29 Kate Cook and David Bowles, Growing Pains: The Developing Relationship of Animal Welfare Standards 
and the World Trade Rules (2010) 19(2) Review of European Community & International Law 227, p228  
30 Katie Sykes, Sealing animal welfare into GATT exceptions, at (n.3) p481  
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32 EU Parliamentary Report (n.17) 
33 ibid 
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35 EU Commission Report, (n.24) p7  
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standards. There has been an increased demand for free-range eggs and meat, and increased public 
support for animal welfare regulation.37 The harmful processes mentioned above are likely to be ill-
favoured by consumers, who wish to see higher animal welfare standards. Not only is there a concern 
around the morality of these practices, but a concern about the food safety of products with lower animal 
welfare standards.38  
There may be an argument that the market will regulate itself where animal welfare standards are 
concerned, as consumer concerns will decrease purchase of products with bad practices. However, this 
would be an insufficient answer to the animal welfare question. Firstly, it would require mandatory 
labelling for goods with low welfare, in order for markets to make an informed choice, and the following 
section will show that such a practice may be a barrier to trade. Furthermore, if there is an international 
recognition that high animal welfare in agriculture is desirable, market preference is not enough to 
deliver higher standards. Lastly, market regulation does not stop the practices that consumers find 
harmful, it would merely work as a deterrent against them if market trends were clear enough to show 
that low animal welfare causes a fall in demand. Mishan notes that “compulsory labelling and the spread 
of consumer information can only go so far in checking these repugnant commercial practices. In view 
of the financial temptations, the strictest government controls will always be necessary if a significant 
deterrent to cruel and inhumane treatment of farm and domesticated animals is to prevail.”39   
Swinbank opines that consumer demand may turn into an expectation that every product available on 
the market has the same production method and animal welfare standards.40 Due to the current 
fragmentation of animal welfare standards globally, this may not always be the case. States can only 
accommodate for consumer expectations by legislating to ensure that informed choices can be made on 
product standards (i.e. mandatory labelling systems for imports), or by altogether banning the import 
and marketing of a product that does not meet the expected threshold of animal welfare standards. These 
types of regulations will be the focus of this article; when such legislation is drafted, a conflict in the 
WTO may arise.41  
2.2 WTO provisions that may hinder animal welfare progression  
The following section of this article will discuss how WTO law could be hindering increased farmed 
animal welfare and better agricultural practices. Most importantly, the article discusses Articles I, III 
and XX of GATT 1994. The following sections show how animal welfare standards imposed on imports 
will generally conflict with the WTO framework, as the prohibition of protectionism and discrimination 
under WTO law precludes contracting parties from banning products with low animal welfare 
standards, or subjecting them to different rules on labelling. This is exacerbated by the framework on 
exceptions to the general principles of free trade, which does not appear to accommodate for the farmed 
animal welfare concerns of contracting parties.  
a. GATT Articles I, III, and the definition of ‘like products’  
All farmed animal welfare legislation will most likely conflict with the fundamental rules of the 
multilateral trading system, which are contained in GATT42 Article I of GATT ensures that trade 
liberalisation is equal amongst the contracting parties, it contains the ‘most favoured nation’ principle 
(MFN). If any WTO Member offers favourable duties, import taxes or regulation of trade to another 
member for certain products, then all WTO members must be extended the same treatment for like 
                                                          
37 Eurobarometer shows that an overwhelming majority of Europeans consider farmed animal welfare to be 
important, and that stronger protections should be in place: Special Eurobarometer 442 ‘Attitudes of Europeans 
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38 EU Parliamentary (n.17) 
39 Ezra Joshua Mishan, Economists versus the Greens: an exposition and a critique, 64 The Political Quarterly 
(1993) 222-242. 
40 Alan Swinbank, 'Like Products, Animal Welfare and the World Trade Organization', at (n.26) p 695-696 
41 ibid 
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products. The way that any one member treats all other members, is the same way it treats its ‘most 
favoured nation.’  
Article III of GATT is the main source of conflict where animal welfare and international trade meet, 
because it lays down the principle of national treatment. This prohibits contracting parties from 
imposing taxes, rules and regulations that afford protection to national products; it states: “The products 
of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in 
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”43   
Swinbank notes that the identification of ‘like products’ is paramount when considering the 
compatibility of certain domestic regulation with international trade laws, which poses difficulties for 
members of the WTO wanting to impose animal welfare standards that importers would also have to 
adhere to. WTO law, as per the dispute settlement panels, defines ‘like products’ as having no regard 
to process or production methods, meaning a product cannot be treated differently simply because, for 
example, its process is more environmentally destructive or more concerned with animal welfare.  If 
the end products have no physical difference, they should be treated equally. Animal welfare standards 
are therefore not a reason for product differentiation, as they are non-product related, and do not alter 
the physical make-up of the end product. This definition applies regardless of the value that can be 
asserted about the processing technique, as the following two cases illustrate.   
In the US – Tuna I44 dispute, a US measure banned imports from countries which did not use comparable 
fishing methods to the US, or had a dolphin death rate of more than 1.25 times the average of the US. 
Mexico lodged a complaint under GATT 1947, which revealed the issue of process-ignorance in the 
definition of ‘like products’. The panel in this dispute applied GATT Article III and the national 
treatment principle, and found the US embargo to be incompatible with GATT because (inter alia) the 
repeated use of the word ‘product’ in GATT emphasises the importance of the end physical product, 
and not the process in which it is made. Kelch45 notes how this definition leads to a regime where a 
country could regulate the size of eggs but not how they were made; it could impose restrictions on 
eggs of a physicality but not on those that had been produced in an inherently cruel and inhumane 
manner.  The US – Shrimp46 dispute concerned a US import ban that aimed to protect sea turtles that 
would be accidentally caught and killed by fishing methods that did not use a turtle excluder device. 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand raised a dispute under GATT due to the measure affecting their 
fishing practices, requiring them to use turtle excluder devices during all fishing, which would increase 
costs, as well as constituting the US forcing their environmental policies on countries wishing to trade 
in their territory. The WTO decision that this was incompatible with GATT Article XI (prohibition on 
import restrictions) was not contested by the US at all.   
The definition of like products creates the problem that animal welfare provisions imposed on imports 
could become a barrier to trade. For instance, mandatory labelling would be required to allow consumers 
to make informed choices about the food products they are buying. If the EU, or any other WTO 
member, were to impose mandatory labelling on imports of eggs or meat products, this may constitute 
those products not being treated the same as ‘like’ products in the domestic market. If the legislature 
banned the import of eggs or meat produced through inhumane processes, this would certainly 
constitute a restriction on trade, because the eggs and meat imported from elsewhere would have the 
same physical characteristics as those made with animal welfare measures in place.  
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This will hinder progression by deterring legislatures from imposing animal welfare standards on 
imports, or from imposing them at all. It will also deter compliance for producers, in order to remain 
competitive and creates a race to the bottom for animal welfare standards. Furthermore, the definition 
of like products and its effect on animal welfare development imposes unequal treatment on domestic 
products with good agricultural practices, which seems to be against the entire logic of Article III 
GATT. These issues will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 
The current definition of ‘like products’ could deter legislatures, through fear of an expensive WTO 
dispute, from adopting measures that would adequately protect consumers from inhumane products and 
businesses from competition from products that do not adhere to welfare standards. For instance, during 
the debate on banning battery cages in egg production, the possibility of this causing a WTO challenge 
was raised.47 There was also some backlash against the ban, because some felt that “the European 
Union is putting its own producers at a competitive disadvantage by specifying stricter rules for them 
than those it applies to external suppliers for imports.”48 This sentiment has been repeated in other 
agricultural debates regarding high animal welfare standards, with Member State representatives feeling 
the EU is hypocritical,49 and disadvantaging their farmers by not seeking international compliance.50 
The European Union, although leading the development of animal welfare, does not currently extend 
its values and practices to imports. Instead, the EU focuses on being a ‘lighthouse’ for other jurisdictions 
and raising awareness of animal welfare standards.51 Whilst it cannot be categorically proven that the 
looming threat of an expensive WTO dispute is at the heart of the EU decision to defer from imposing 
import restrictions, there is no doubt that the deterrence factor of WTO law would be incredibly strong 
for agricultural measures, because of the huge volume of imports and exports of meat and livestock 
globally, increasing the likelihood that a conflict will arise. Presently, national and regional legislatures 
have to choose between adopting regulations that promote good agricultural practice but forcing 
businesses to compete with products that do not do this, or imposing trade restrictions on products 
without comparable processes and facing a WTO dispute, or not introducing animal welfare standards 
in agricultural processes at all. As long as these restrictive choices prevail, international standards for 
animal welfare in agriculture will be slow to develop.  
Furthermore, the dilution of animal welfare legislation that occurs out of fear of a WTO dispute means 
that animal welfare will remain segmented in different domestic jurisdictions, meaning it will take much 
longer to reach an international cohesion if members will only regulate their domestic producers and 
will not enforce import bans or product requirements against each other. The bad animal welfare 
practices of certain states will remain in place because there will be no incentive for change. The current 
framework promulgates a race to the bottom of animal welfare standards, as States are in the best 
position when they are not increasing animal welfare.52 Certain states therefore may choose to keep 
their animal welfare as low as possible to exploit a market that is being more conscientious about the 
welfare of animals. Kelch notes how the WTO basically imposes on states ‘the worst possible 
environmental and animal welfare legislation’ in order to remain competitive.53  This creates a lack of 
cohesion between the WTO approach to animal welfare and the increase of animal welfare concern 
internationally. At the general international level animal welfare is important and increasingly desirable, 
but its importance is drastically undermined if the multilateral trading throws into question the 
legitimacy of animal welfare measures, by effectively rewarding bad animal welfare practice. 
For producers of agricultural goods, even if there are domestic welfare standards imposed, there is a 
lack of incentive to meet these obligations if products with low animal welfare standards can still be 
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imported into the market. As noted above, Member States of the EU are discontent with the rising 
animal welfare standards, from a point of international trade. During the process of debating and 
implementing the battery cage ban, many Member States were reluctant to invest in changing their 
farming processes, despite the agreement that battery cages were an unnecessary and cruel farming 
practice.54 The EU’s latest animal welfare strategy is also proving to lack fully effective compliance,55 
in some instances the Member State felt that EU measures on developing and implementing animal 
welfare may hinder the competitiveness of the national market.56   
Lastly, there is the issue of the competitive inequality caused by Article III GATT. Where producers do 
comply with animal welfare measures that a legislature has put into place, they can face market 
punishment as a direct result of Article III GATT. Stevenson57 notes that EU producers feared they 
would be driven out of the European market by importers who could still produce eggs cheaply using 
battery cages, because GATT would not permit import restrictions on those products. Whilst it is 
impossible to concretely predict any trade outcomes, it is clear that Article III overreaches its proper 
role and function in regard to animal welfare measures.  Article III protects WTO members from having 
their trade liberalisation suffer from national protectionism, it promotes trade equality and fair 
competition between goods. Thus, it is not entirely rational that standards and process requirements 
imposed on all products at the national level, could be conceived as protectionist when also applied to 
products from outside the territory. If such requirements were not applied at the national level already, 
that would certainly create an unfair advantage for national producers. To reverse this, so that domestic 
suppliers must adhere to regulations that importers do not, creates reverse protectionism for imports. 
True equality and fair competition would entail treating free range eggs alike and battery eggs alike etc. 
Therefore, free range eggs would enjoy the same treatment as domestic eggs and battery eggs would be 
banned the same as in the domestic market. What essentially occurs currently is punishment of a 
member who is being morally conscientious and an advantage is possibly given to states that are willing 
to let animals suffer undeniable harm and cruel treatment.     
The previous section has shown that GATT, particularly Article III, creates problems for domestic 
legislatures who wish to increase their standards on farmed animal welfare. As a rule, product 
requirements in the form of mandatory labelling or import bans will prima facie breach GATT and 
could result in a WTO dispute. The following section will show that even when legislatures take the 
risk and intend to fight their animal welfare cause in front of a WTO panel, there is little in the GATT 
exceptions that would enable them to justify breaching the multilateral trading framework.    
b. Article XX: GATT Exceptions for Farmed Animal Welfare Measures: 
Article XX of GATT allows for policy concerns to override GATT, with the ten general exceptions.58  
There are three exceptions that could apply to animal welfare legislation are: (a) in relation to public 
morals, (b) in relation to protection of animal health and life and (g) in relation to the preservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. Any state wishing to invoke an exception needs to successfully argue for 
the specific exception itself and then successfully argue that the legislation or measure in question does 
not infringe the general provision of Article XX, the chapeau, which may prove difficult. 
Article XX (b) is the most obvious exception for a state wishing to justify a farm animal welfare measure 
would be that of animal health and life as it expressly refers to animal. However, it does not expressly 
refer to animal welfare. A measure may be justified under this exception if it can be proven that the 
policy objective is to protect human, animal or plant life or health and that this specific measure is 
necessary to achieve that policy objective. Prima facie, states could argue that animal welfare legislation 
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is intended to increase farm animal health, as obviously decreasing mental and physical suffering of the 
animals involved will have positive health impacts. A state could even argue that animal welfare 
legislation protects human health and life under Art XX (b) because lower animal welfare standards can 
lead to the spread of infectious diseases.59 However, this would require a rather wide reading of Art. 
XX (b), and considering the WTO panels already exhibit a tendency to interpret exceptions 
restrictively,60 it is unlikely to actually aid Members who wish to impose animal welfare standards. The 
greatest problem with using Article XX (b) to justify animal welfare restrictions on trade is that 
Members would essentially be arguing that their measures are intended to protect the life and health of 
animals that are not within their territory, or their jurisdiction. Stevenson61 notes how this was a bar to 
the US using XX(g) in Tuna-Dolphin I and II. By requiring fishing methods that protected the life and 
welfare of dolphins, and imposing this on imports, the US was attempting to protect dolphins that were 
not within its own territory. The WTO dispute settlement panel did not accept that it was possible for a 
Member to so heavily impose policies on another Member’s territory.62   
On top of the aforementioned difficulties, any member arguing for farm animal welfare measures under 
this exception would need to show it was necessary to protect animal or human health, under the general 
principles of Article XX.63 This would mean the measure itself could not have been any less trade 
restrictive. The most effective way for domestic legislatures to protect their markets from products that 
fall below animal welfare standards, is to place import bans on products that do not adhere to those 
standards. It will be hard to prove the ‘necessity’ of this, as such measures will be highly restrictive. 
The necessity would also require any Member to show that animal welfare is imperative for human 
health (a strained interpretation for most countries), or that it is imperative for animal health in 
agriculture. The problem with this is that agriculture itself is not good for animal health, especially meat 
production where the end result is slaughter. Any measures to protect animal health are so stunted in 
terms of longevity, that their necessity could be easily called into question by the very nature of food 
trade.   
It is clear that this exception is uncertain at best and it seemingly would not be easy for any member to 
use it to claim legitimacy for their farm-animal welfare measures. Therefore in practice, what appeared 
the most obvious exception to argue for animal welfare measures would actually be ruled out of much 
use. A state would either have to argue that farmed animal welfare was an issue of public morals or an 
issue of preservation, which is also problematic in the context of farmed animal welfare. 
The applicability of Article XX (g) (concerning preservation) to farmed animal welfare is also 
somewhat dubious. The appellate body in US – Shrimp64 confirmed that Art. XX (g) will apply to living 
resources, due to the commitment of the international community at preserving living things as well as 
non-living. This decision was a step forward in terms of conservation and animal welfare but the same 
outcome is unlikely to be arrived at in relation to farmed animals. The protected animal in the US-
Shrimp dispute was turtles, which are internationally recognised as being endangered under CITES.65 
Chaudhri66 notes that although livestock numbers are finite, there is no conservation involved in 
protecting animals from harm when they are going to be slaughtered and consumed anyway. Chaudhri 
states that certain conserved animals are still consumed (such as tuna) but their numbers are not 
controllable by humans, unlike the amount of cattle sent for slaughter.67 The simple matter is that animal 
welfare has no impact on the number of farmed animals killed.  This would mean that the last two 
exceptions that at first looked like a possible justification for a state imposing farm animal welfare 
measure, would be ruled out due to the technicalities of their wording. Therefore, a member would have 
                                                          
59 See EFSA website <https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/animal-welfare> (accessed 06.08.19)  
60 Stevenson (n.57) p112 
61 ibid 
62 US – Tuna I & II (n.44)  
63 See Chapeau of Article XX GATT (n.42) 
64 US – Shrimp (n.46)  
65 Appendix I, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973  
66 Chaudhri, Radhika, Animal Welfare and the WTO: The Legality and Implications of Live Export Restrictions 
under International Trade Law, Federal Law Review, Vol. 42, Issue 2 (2014) 279-308 
67 ibid 
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to succeed in justifying their measure under the public morals exception, or have it deemed incompatible 
with WTO law. 
So, we must turn to the morality exception in Article XX (a). Cook and Bowles68 argue that it would be 
easiest for a WTO member to prove necessity from a moral perspective, because the ethics of animal 
welfare issues dictate that certain products should not be available to consumers at all. If this were to 
be a successful justification, the disputing Member could not argue that a labelling system or some other 
less restrictive measure would be adequate in place of an import ban. 
There are compelling arguments to suggest that animal welfare legislation would fit within the scheme 
of the ‘public morals’ exception. This is confirmed by the EC-Seals69 panel decision. This dispute 
concerned a measure that banned imports of seal products into the EU unless they satisfied strict 
exceptions.70 Canada and Norway raised objections to the ban, and this became the first WTO dispute 
based on moralistic (rather than environmental) animal welfare concerns and restrictions on trade.71 The 
preamble of the regime implemented by the EU referenced the animal welfare concerns of the public 
about the pain, distress and fear of seals that were hunted.72  The measure was found to be inconsistent 
with the most favoured nation principle, because it did not accord the same treatment to Norway and 
Canada as it did to Greenland.73 It was also found that the overall measure (and not the specific, 
discriminatory exceptions) would be justifiable under Article XX (a)74 due to its policy objective of 
public morals and the genuine public concern about the hunting methods of seals. However, it was held 
that the regime did not meet the requirements of the chapeau75 because the measure was discriminatory, 
due to the exceptions in the regulation giving favourable treatment to Greenland.76 
Although this decision is a step in the right direction because it evidences a dispute settlement panel 
recognising the importance of animal welfare in international trade, there is still a long way to go before 
agricultural developments in farmed animal welfare are accepted and desired. A state wanting to 
successfully justify an import ban for agricultural items with low animal welfare would have to prove 
the policy objective was to protect public morals, and also that it was necessary to do so and would 
have to satisfy the chapeau of Article XX. There are a number of reasons why this may be difficult in 
terms of more intensively farmed goods, such as regular meat or egg products.  
Public morality is the most forgiving exception for trade restrictions, because there is a large degree of 
deference given to Members to recognise and regulate the morality of their territories.77 However, this 
deference is not unqualified and even after public morality is established, a careful balancing act that 
considers the necessity of import restrictions to protect those morals is undertaken.78  
Firstly, public support for the EC-Seals regime was evidenced with a large amount of petitions, letters 
and general public outrage, and although there is evidence (particularly in the EU) that consumers do 
care about the welfare of farmed animals, the same amount of public involvement may not exist towards 
farmed animals that are widely consumed. However, there should not be a need for extremity and 
external pressure before the WTO recognises an issue as one of morality, especially in relation to 
                                                          
68 Cook and Bowles (n.29)  
69 DS401: European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
2014  
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trade in seal products 
71 Sykes (n.3) p471  
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74 ibid at para 7.631-7.632 and 8.8(b) 
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76 ibid at para 8.9(c) 
77 Cook and Bowles (n.29) p232-233, Sykes (n.3) p473  
78 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R; 
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something like animal welfare that can be seen as an international good. Sykes notes that the 
international developments regarding the recognition of the value of animal welfare may make it easier 
for a panel to find that certain trade restrictions are necessary to meet the objective of protecting public 
morals.79 It is therefore possible that, especially after EC-Seals, a WTO dispute settlement panel will 
recognise the general importance of animal welfare for the protection of consumers and the public in 
general.  
Secondly, the necessity of restrictions will have to be balanced against the general interests of trade. 
This means that, firstly a Member will have to show that their measure was necessary to protect public 
morals and that there are no viable alternatives that are less trade restrictive.80 If the complaining 
Member offers an alternative, it is up to the responding Member to prove why that was not a viable 
option. Cook and Bowles81 suggest that in these circumstances, any Member trying to justify an animal 
welfare restriction would have to show that the process of certain production methods is inherently 
inhumane, rather than simply under-regulated, in order to legitimise preventing the marketing of the 
end product within their territory. This is likely to prove incredibly difficult, particularly in relation to 
animals that intended for and will eventually be slaughtered, as the end practice is ultimately the same 
across most manufacturers. Secondly, exactly how restrictive on trade a measure is likely to be will 
ultimately determine overall how necessary it is. Stevenson notes that “there is a feeling that, when it 
comes to animal protection measures, the panels and Appellate Body will always rule in favour of trade 
liberalisation. Indeed, when a measure designed to save a species from extinction (as in Shrimp-Turtle) 
cannot survive a WTO challenge, it is hard to believe that any animal protection laws will ever be held 
to satisfy the GATT rules.”82  
Thirdly, the extra-territoriality of the issue would have to be discussed. As with Article XX(b) and (g), 
there may be an assertion by any disputing Member that domestic or regional animal welfare standards 
should not be imposed on animals outside that territory. This was raised during the EC-Seals dispute 
by the panel, but since the complaining parties themselves did not raise the issue, it was not taken into 
consideration or deliberated upon. Whilst this will be a barrier to any successful justification of animal 
welfare restrictions on trade, Stevenson provides an insightful argument against the extra-territoriality. 
He argues that Members should be able to recognise and regulate the morality of products within their 
own territories, and to properly do so Members have to be able to fully exclude products with immoral 
(i.e. low animal welfare) qualities from their territory.83 Animal welfare restrictions are not an issue of 
Members pushing their standards into extra-territorial jurisdiction, but are more about comprehensively 
regulating the morality of markets within their own. Whether the WTO would accept such an argument 
is debatable, but at present the framework created by Articles I, III and XX ensures that Members are 
reluctant to test import bans at a dispute panel.  
To summarise, although it is prima facie possible for an animal welfare restriction on trade to fall under 
the GATT exceptions, it is de facto impossible to assume that the restriction is justifiable. The intensity 
of farming practices and the volume of international trade in agricultural farmed products makes it 
unlikely that there will not be some finding against a Member regarding the necessity of their 
restrictions, or their evidence of public morality.    
Conclusion 
 
International recognition of animal welfare as a common value is expanding. At present, the WTO legal 
framework does not accommodate for developments in farming standards the way that it should. There 
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is evidence that legislatures are interested in developing better agricultural practices that reduce 
unnecessary suffering and harm of farmed animals, in line with consumer tastes and preferences. 
However, the definition of like products, which does not take process into account when determining 
the comparability of products for trade liberalisation, will effectively deter legislatures from setting the 
same standards on import of meat and food products in agricultural trade. Although article III of GATT 
is intended to protect WTO Members from protectionist measures, it makes it difficult for states to treat 
products that are comparable in the eyes of consumers and manufacturers equally. Instead, reverse 
discrimination is a likely outcome of animal welfare developments in regional and domestic laws. This 
will keep animal welfare from developing internationally, with better farming practices remaining 
fragmented and subject to mutual agreements among Members of the WTO. Were Article III to 
recognise the importance of process for animal welfare, and take into consideration cruel and inhumane 
production methods during the comparing of products, greater international standards of trade may 
result. 
Although there is scope to suggest that the WTO framework balances the non-recognition of product 
processes (and heightened trade liberalisation), with domestic concerns in the Article XX(a) exception 
regarding protection of public morals, this is not enough. The force of Article III’s deterrence is self-
evident, domestic legislatures across the globe have concerned themselves with farmed animal welfare 
standards without risking to impose the same requirements on imports. This is specifically a problem 
for intensively farmed agricultural products, because the sheer volume of global trade in food products 
will undoubtedly lead to a WTO dispute in the event of import bans. The deterrent effect opens the 
market to abuse by those who would continue inhumane farming practices, regardless of public and 
consumer opinion. The overall effect of the WTO trading system, and its relationship with animal 
welfare, is to reward bad practice that is increasingly outdated. In turn, this makes domestic and regional 
relationships with animal welfare practice fraught, as markets can become saturated with less morally 
conscientious products.  
As the WTO framework is built to liberalise trade, to ensure equality and to recognise the ability of 
sovereign legislatures to regulate consumer choices and preferences, the current scheme is flawed. 
Trade liberalisation is still possible with high animal welfare standards, as is equal treatment of products 
that should be comparable. Currently, it is difficult for sovereign Members to regulate their markets and 
protect their consumers. This is not an issue of trade protectionism for national products, but over-
protective trading practices for international products with low welfare compliance. This article has 
shown that WTO law is not only hindering progress in international animal welfare standards, but doing 
so against the premise of its own role and function.    
